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Abstract
This paper clarifies how uncertainty affects irreversible investment in a
competitive market equilibrium. With free entry, irreversibility affects the
distribution of future prices, and thereby creates an opportunity cost of
investing now rather than waiting. As with an imperfectly competitive firm,
uncertainty can also increase the value of a marginal unit of capital. I show
that with an infinite horizon, the opportunity cost is larger than this increase
in value, so that uncertainty reduces investment.
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Uncertainty over future output prices or input costs can affect
investment by a risk-neutral firm in two opposing ways. First, it can
increase the value of the marginal unit of capital, which leads to more
investment. This only requires that the stream of future profits generated
by the marginal unit be a convex function of the stochastic variable; by
Jensen's inequality, the expected present value of that stream is increased.
This result was demonstrated by Hartman (1972), and later extended by Abel
(1983) and others. In their models, convexity in output price and input
costs is due to capital's substitutability with other factors. But even
with fixed proportions, convexity in ensured by the ability of the firm to
vary output, so that the marginal unit of capital need not be utilized.1
If investment is irreversible and can be postponed, a second effect of
uncertainty is to create an opportunity cost of investing now, rather than
waiting for new information to arrive before committing resources. This
increases the full cost of the marginal unit of capital, which reduces
investment.2 Hence the net effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment
depends on the size of this opportunity cost relative to the increase in
the value of the marginal unit of capital.
Caballero (1991) has recently argued that for a perfectly competitive
firm with constant returns to scale, this opportunity cost is zero, so that
uncertainty over future demand unambiguously increases current investment,
even if that investment is irreversible. This is in contradiction to the
negative relationship between uncertainty and irreversible investment found
by Pindyck (1988) and Bertola (1989), and is significant because of possible
policy implications. Caballero suggests that such a negative relationship
requires either decreasing returns to scale or imperfect competition.
Caballero's result is based on a model with convex adjustment costs.
An interesting and innovative aspect of the model is that these costs can be
asymmetric, thereby allowing for partial or complete irreversibility;
complete irreversibility corresponds to a cost of downward adjustment that
is infinite. The model is particularly useful in that it allows one to
study the sensitivity of the investment-uncertainty relationship to the
extent of asymmetry in adjustment costs.
An important aspect of Caballero's model, shared with Abel's (1983) and
other models of this kind, is that the size of the firm would be unbounded
were it not for adjustment costs. In fact it is only adjustment costs that
determine firm size. As I show below, this role of adjustment costs is
crucial to the results of Caballero and earlier authors regarding the effect
of uncertainty on investment. While it is helpful for studying the behavior
of a firm in isolation, this adjustment cost framework is inconsistent with
a competitive market equilibrium, and hence with the behavior of a
competitive firm. To study a competitive market equilibrium, one must make
price and industry output endogenous, and doing so restores the positive
opportunity cost associated with irreversible investment.
1. Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility.
A firm that has constant returns to scale everywhere and faces an
infinitely elastic demand curve will have a profit function that is linear
in the capital stock. Hence convex costs of some kind are needed to bound
the size of the firm; otherwise the firm would expand indefinitely if its
marginal profit exceeded the cost of a unit of capital. In Caballero's
model, convex adjustment costs serve this role by making the cost of
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investment an increasing function of the level of investment. But because
these adjustment costs are a function of only the level of investment,
investment in each period is independent of investment or the stock of
capital in any other period -- there are no "intertemporal links."
This, however, necessarily eliminates irreversibility from the
problem. Irreversibility matters when it causes decisions made now to
constrain decisions in the future under some states of nature but not under
others. For example, a firm that invests a large amount this period would
not want to disinvest next period if demand expands, and so would not be
constrained by irreversibility. This large investment would lead it to be
constrained, however, if demand were to contract, because then it would want
to disinvest. This is why irreversibility creates an opportunity cost,
which leads the firm to invest somewhat less this period.
This can never arise when the size of the firm is constrained only by
adjustment costs. Then investment next period depends only on the
realization of demand that period and on the adjustment cost function; it is
completely independent of investment this period. Hence the firm need only
compare the marginal cost of investing to current and expected future
marginal profits. Since uncertainty increases expected future marginal
profits, it necessarily increases investment.
Convex adjustment costs may indeed affect the rate at which firms
invest (although simple "time to build" and the lumpiness of investment are
likely to be more important constraints). It seems unrealistic, however, to
treat adjustment costs as the sole or main determinant of firm and industry
size in equilibrium. In fact, a pure adjustment cost model is inconsistent
with a competitive market equilibrium. In principle, free entry will ensure
that a very large number of very small firms come into the industry. (Very
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small firms would enter because they would have very small adjustment costs
and hence lower total costs.) In the limit, the industry would be composed
of an infinite number of infinitesimally small firms, and so each firm would
have no adjustment costs.
Even if each firm is contrained to some minimum size, the possibility
of entry by new firms or expansion of existing ones will ensure that
investment decisions are intertemporally linked. As a result, uncertainty
will affect irreversible investment by a competitive firm with constant
returns to scale much as it would a noncompetitive firm, or a firm with
decreasing returns. The reason is that in each period, if demand increases
existing firms will expand or new firms will enter until the market clears.
From the point of view of an individual firm, this limits the amount that
price can rise under good demand outcomes. However, if investment is
irreversible, there is no similar mechanism to prevent price from falling
under bad demand outcomes. Each firm takes price as given, but it knows
that the distribution of future prices is affected by the irreversibility of
investment industry-wide. This reduces its own incentive to invest.
Most of the literature on irreversible investment has focused on the
individual firm, 3 as does Caballero in his model of asymmetric adjustment
costs. But in a competitive equilibrium, uncertainty affects investment
through the feedback of industry-wide capacity expansion and new entry on
the distribution of prices. The following example illustrates this by
extending Caballero's two-period model to allow for this feedback.
2. An Example.
As in Caballero's model, each firm is in place two periods, there is no
depreciation or discounting, and the production function is Cobb-Douglas:
(1) qi - ALK1-a 0 < a < 1
- 5 -
where qi is the output of firm i. Market demand is isoelastic:
(2) Pt -Q 1/ t
where e is the elasticity of demand, and Zt is a stochastic process, with 21
- 1. For simplicity, we let Z2 equal 0 or 2 with equal probability. We
will compare this to the certainty case in which Z2 - 1. Also, we will
restrict the discussion to the case of complete irreversibility, with no
cost of adjusting Ki upward. (In Caballero's notation, 71 - 0 and 72 - c.)
Let there be a large number, N, of equal size firms, so that each takes
price as given, and Q - Nqi. The profit function for each firm is then:
(3) Hi - hP7K i
where h - (l-a)A1/(1 -a)(o/w)a / (1 a ) , and 1 -l/(l-a) > 1. Also, qi - BKi,
where B - h/(l-a). With no loss of generality, we choose A so that B - 1.
Note that the value of a marginal unit of capital is hPn, whatever the firm
or industry capital stock. This value is convex in P, so its expectation is
increased by a mean-preserving spread in P. But as we will see, this need
not mean that uncertainty leads the firm to invest more.
First, consider the certainty case. Here, P2 - P1 , and all investment
occurs in period 1. Each firm will want to invest an infinite amount if
2hP7 > k, and nothing if 2hPY < k, where k is the cost of a unit of capital.
Thus in equilibrium, firms invest until price falls to the point that 2hPY -
k. Hence P - P2 - (k/2h)1 /q. Industry investment in the first period is
Ii - K,1 - 1 - (2h/k)'/. (Each firm's investment is just 1/N of this.)
Now suppose that Z2 is unknown when firms invest in period 1; it can
turn out to be 2 or 0, each with probability .5. Although Zt is exogenous,
Pt is determined as part of the market equilibrium. To find this equili-
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brium, we want a distribution for Pt that results from Zt and from firms'
investment decisions, with those decisions based on this same distribution.5
We will surmise that equilibrium investment in period 1 is small enough
so that in period 2, firms invest some positive amount if Z2 - 2 (whereas
they invest nothing if Z2 - 0). After solving for Il we will check that
this is indeed the case. Then if Z2 - 2, firms will invest in period 2 to
the point that the profit from a unit of capital equals its cost, i.e.,
until hP3 - k, or P2 - (k/h)/'/. This implies that K2 will equal (P2/2) -
2t(h/k)W/1. Of course if Z2 - 0, P2 - 0, 12 - 0, and K 2 - K1.
Given this distribution for price in period 2, risk-neutral firms will
invest in period 1 to the point that the expected value of a unit of capital
equals its cost:
(4) hP7 + El[hP3] - k,
or, hKl"/l + .5k - k.
Hence II - K1 - (2h/k)E/ q . Finally, we check that 12 is indeed positive if
Z2 - 2. If Z2 - 2, 12 - K 2 - K1 - (2e - 2/'?)(h/k) E/' > 0, since 17 > 1.
In contrast to Caballero's result, we have found that period 1
investment is the same when Z2 is uncertain as it is when Z2 - 1 with
certainty. The reason is that while a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of P2 increases the value of a unit of capital, a mean-
preserving spread in Z2 reduces the expected value of P2. The equilibrium
response of firms limits price increases under good outcomes of Z2 , but
because of irreversibility, it does not limit price decreases under bad
outcomes. In this particular example these two effects just offset each
other, so investment is left unchanged.6
The Appendix extends this example to n periods and allows Zt to follow
a random walk; it begins at 1 and increases or decreases by 100% in each
- 7 -
period. The Appendix shows that investment in period 1 is lower when Zt is
stochastic, as long as n > 3. Also, in any period, the difference between
investment when future values of Zt are known and investment when they are
stochastic grows with the number of periods remaining. The reason is that
the variance of future values of Zt increases with the time horizon, but
industry investment always limits price increases under good outcomes.7
3. Concluding Remarks.
The simple example presented above shows how the negative effect of
uncertainty on irreversible investment remains even when the firm is
perfectly competitive and has constant returns to scale. That effect is
mediated by the equilibrium behavior of all firms, and the resulting impact
on market price. In the two-period example above, that effect just offsets
the increase in the value of a unit of capital that results from the
convexity of the marginal profit function, so that period 1 investment is
left unchanged by a mean-preserving spread in the demand shift variable.
When the number of periods exceeds 2, period 1 investment is lower when
future demand is uncertain.
In the example, we found the equilibrium distribution for price and the
levels of investment in each period consistent with that distribution.
Alternatively, we could have used the fact, demonstrated by Lucas and
Prescott (1971), that the competitive equilibrium is the solution to the
social planning problem. The social planner will use the downward sloping
demand curve to calculate the optimal investment rule. Hence she will solve
an optimal investment problem that is identical in structure to that of a
monopolist with constant returns to scale. When investment is irreversible,
that problem is the one treated by Pindyck (1988) and Bertola (1989), and
their results will once again hold.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix extends the two-period example to n periods, where Z1 -
1, and then in each succeeding period, Zt increases or decreases by 100%,
with probability 1/2 for each. Thus Z2 - 0 or 2. If Z2 - 0, Zt remains 0
for all future t, but if Z2 - 2, Z3 - 0 or 4, and so on. As before, there
is no depreciation or discounting. Hence in the certainty case (Zt - 1
always), firms invest in the period 1 to the point that
(A.1) nhP7 - nh(Kll/e) - k
so I1 - K1 - (nh/k)/& , It - 0 for t > 1, and P1 - P 2 - ... - (k/nh)1 /"'
We will again find a solution for the stochastic case by surmising that
investment is positive in a good state (i.e., when Zt+ 1 > Zt), and then
check that this is indeed the case. First, in period n, the good state is
that in which Zn - 2n-l . In this state, firms invest until Pn - (k/h)1 /q'
Thus Kn - (Pn/Zn)- 
- 2e(n-l)(h/k)'/ 1, and In - Kn - Kn-I 1
In period n-l, in the good state Zn- 1  2n2, and firms invest to the
point that hP9. 1 + En.l[hP ] - k, which implies that:
(A.2) h(2n-2K-1/'E + .5k - k
n-1
or, Kn-1 - [2n(n-2 )+lh/k]E/n
Note that since n > 1, Kn > Kn_1 in a good state, as we surmised. In period
n-2, in the good state firms invest to the point that hPn.2 + E n 2 [hPn. 1 +
hPq] - k, so that Kn2 - [2'(n-3 )+1 h/k]6/n. In general, in a good state:
(A.3) Kn-m - [2q(n-m-l)+lh/k]c/n
Finally, working back to period 1, Il - K1 - (2h/k)'/1. Note that this is
smaller than the certainty case when n > 2.
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1. Then the marginal profit of capital at each time t in the future is
max[0, (pt - ct)], where ct is variable cost. Thus a unit of capital
represents a set of call options on future production, which are worth
more the greater the variance of pt and/or ct.
2. For a detailed discussion of this point and a survey of the recent
literature on irreversibility and its implications for investment and
market evolution, see Pindyck (1990).
3. Exceptions are Dixit (1989, 1991), Leahy (1990), and Lippman and Rumelt
(1985).
4. This can also be the case under imperfect competition.
5. This is easy to do for this simple example. Leahy (1990) solves the
more general continuous-time problem.
6. If Z2 - 1 with certainty, P2 - (k/2h)1 /', but if Z2 - 0 or 2, E1(P2) -
I(k/h) 1/ , which is smaller since n > 1. The expected marginal profit
of capital is k/2 in both cases.
7. Like our two-period example, the n-period example in the Appendix
ignores depreciation and discounting. Hence if Zt - 1 for all t, the
value of a unit of capital grows linearly with n, but it grows less
rapidly if Zt is stochastic expected future prices are lower.
Including depreciation and discounting would reduce the depressive
effect of uncertainty on current investment.
